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Two Cardiac Arrests, One Medical Team
George Burnham and Donald Mattison 
were patients in adjoining rooms in the 
rehabilitation division of a state medical 
center. George was a thirty-three-year- 
old, severely retarded man who had 
lived in state institutions since the age of 
three. His family had had no contact 
with him for over twenty years. George 
had been trained to feed himself and to 
keep himself reasonably clean, but at 
the age of twenty-five he had suffered a 
cardiac arrest that left him with some 
paralysis. After rehabilitation he only 
occasionally lacked bowel control. A 
second recent cardiac arrest left him 
semi-paralyzed and totally incontinent. 
The chances of his regaining even his 
former level of continence, the stafT felt, 
were hopeless.
Donald Mattison, a forty-eight-year- 
old businessman, active in community
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T.A. he most painful of all medical care 
decisions concerns life-preserving meas­
ures which, because of limited resources, 
require certain individuals to be excluded 
in favor of others. How does one weigh the 
relative rights of individuals to such care? 
Whenever possible, decisions to withhold 
lifesaving therapy should be made in ad­
vance. But in the absence of a clear ex­
pression that lifesaving care should be 
withheld, the person in charge must as­
sume that care was intended. Should in­
competency, the patient’s family status, 
capacity to contribute to society, and re­
lated considerations be woven into the de­
cision-making process? Let us consider
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and church affairs, married, and the fa­
ther of four, had suffered a minor 
stroke, which left him slightly para­
lyzed. In his six weeks on the rehabilita­
tion ward he had regained almost total 
use of his arm and leg. His prognosis for 
full recovery seemed excellent.
The hospital has at least one cardiac- 
arrest team on duty twenty-four hours a 
day, and one crash cart in every patient 
area at all times. The possibility of si­
multaneous cardiac arrests seemed re­
mote. If it were to happen, there would 
not be time to transfer an additional 
crash cart from another patient area, 
since the rehabilitation ward is served 
by an extremely slow elevator.
But in this case the improbable hap­
pened. George had a cardiac arrest at 
3:00 one morning. Within four minutes 
the cardiac team had arrived in his
each case on its own merits, then look at 
the priorities so as to answer the troubling 
question: “Who shall we permit to die?”
George has just suffered his third cardiac 
arrest. Since there was sufficient clinical 
information from two prior arrests to antic­
ipate that cardiac arrest might occur again, 
in the absence of directions not to resusci­
tate we must assume that care should be 
initiated, as it was. George’s severe retar­
dation does not per se justify withholding 
resuscitative efforts, nor does his addi­
tional brain damage and total incontinence. 
The courts have indicated (in the Dinner- 
stein and Spring cases) that cardiopul­
monary resuscitation (CPR) as well as 
other forms of lifesaving and life-prolong­
ing therapy can be withheld in appropriate 
circumstances. But an appraisal by either 
care-provider or family of the “quality of 
life" of the life-long incompetent as a basis 
for withholding such therapy has been spe­
cifically rejected (in the Saikewicz and the 
Storar and Eichner cases).
Recently, the highest court in the State 
of New York ruled without equivocation 
that there exists in some circumstances a 
positive obligation to provide lifesaving 
treatment to the terminally ill life-long in­
competent based on the common law re­
quirement that a guardian act only in the
room and was ready to begin work. At 
that very moment Donald also had a 
cardiac arrest. Knowing of the simulta­
neous cardiac arrests, every team mem­
ber hesitated. Two also knew both 
patients’ histories; the others, including 
the team leader, did not. After a mo­
ment, the team leader said, “ First come, 
first served. Let’s go to work.” With no 
further hesitation, the team began to re­
suscitate George.
Without the emergency aid, Donald 
died. George was resuscitated, but suf­
fered yet another cardiac arrest at 8:20 
the next morning. This time another 
team was unable to revive him, and he 
too died. Did the team leader make the 
right decision in resuscitating George 
instead of Donald? Is “first come, first 
served” the proper principle to apply in 
such cases?
best interest of the ward. While some may 
disagree, that decision supports the con­
clusion that there existed an obligation to 
treat George unless a court had already 
determined that withholding CPR was in 
George’s best interests.
As for Donald, there are no indications 
that he had refused or would refuse re­
suscitation. He had a good prognosis for 
full recovery. He was young, married 
with four children, and employed.
Assuming that George would have re­
ceived the full attention of the CPR team 
had Donald not arrested, how is one to 
proceed fairly? With a single crash cart 
and one cardiac arrest team, if we attempt 
to initiate CPR for both men, it is likely 
both will die. Donald’s prognosis is better 
than George’s. In addition, Donald’s wife 
and children are emotionally and econom­
ically dependent on him so that there are 
broader societal costs were he to die. On 
balance, the choice clearly favors full 
commitment of CPR to Donald. Should 
we then abandon poor George? Or is it 
possible to allocate care in such a way 
that he may survive without seriously 
compromising Donald’s chances?
One approach would be to initiate basic 
life support (artificial ventilation and ex­
ternal chest compression) immediately for
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Donald, using a single member of the 
team, and, as quickly as possible, attempt 
to defibrillate George. If initial attempts 
at defibrillation were unsuccessful, or if 
the attempt took more than thirty to sixty 
seconds, we would abandon efforts with 
George and concentrate totally on Don­
ald. If George were in asystolic cardiac 
arrest (no electrical activity, as opposed 
to chaotic electrical activity in ventricular 
fibrillation) we would terminate efforts on 
his behalf because the likelihood of suc­
cessful resuscitation would be very small 
and the time required would very likely 
preclude Donald’s resuscitation.
This approach is based on the following 
considerations: (1) both George and Don­
ald have a right to lifesaving treatment; 
(2) George’s immediate prognosis is 
poorer than Donald's; (3) the societal 
costs of Donald's death would be substan­
tially greater than those of George’s; (4) 
George’s best chance of returning to his 
previous state is immediate defibrillation.
Even the brief delay to defibrillate 
George may decrease the likelihood of 
successfully resuscitating Donald. But if 
Donald could be effectively ventilated 
(providing adequate air exchange in and 
out of the lungs of a patient whose breath­
ing has ceased) and receive effective ex­
ternal chest compression (for the purpose 
of circulating blood in a patient whose 
heart has stopped beating) for a period not 
to exceed thirty to sixty seconds before all 
energies were directed toward him, the 
delay should not entail great additional 
risk. The small increase in risk to Donald 
must be balanced against the alternative, 
which would be to withhold all chances of 
survival from George. Would that consci­
entious decision making were as simple 
as . . first-come, first-served!”
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TA  o consider what would have been the 
right course of action for the crash-cart 
team leader, let us look at two aspects of 
the case: first, the distributive principles to 
which one might appeal in order to honor 
fundamental moral commitments, and sec-
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ond, the procedural strategies one might 
use to put them into practice.
Of the many possible principles, at least 
three are plausible in this case:
Better prognosis. "When both cannot 
live, treat the one with the better prog­
nosis.” This principle, similar to that used 
in military triage, would clearly have pre­
ferred Donald. It reflects a moral commit­
ment to maximizing the preservation of 
life. It should be applied only where the 
disparity between prognoses of competi­
tors for treatment is relatively great: it will 
decide between two individuals when only 
one is likely to survive if treated, but it will 
not decide cases where the disparity is un­
certain or small (for instance, which pa­
tient will receive a kidney, if one's 
recovery would probably take five weeks 
and the other's six). This principle can be 
applied without reference to George’s re­
tardation: if the medical history of arrests 
had been reversed, he would have been 
preferred.
Social worth. ‘‘When both cannot live, 
prefer the one who has greater value for 
other persons.” This principle, although 
often attacked as inviting racism, sexism, 
and bias against the elderly, retarded, and 
mentally ill. may also be understood with­
out bias: it prefers the person whose con­
tinuing life is of greater importance to 
others. This need not automatically mean 
Donald. Though George was seriously re­
tarded, he might have contributed signifi­
cantly to the life of the patients and staff of 
the ward; conversely, though Donald had 
prominent public status, he might have 
been a vicious abuser of relationships with 
his wife, children, and associates. How­
ever, we have no evidence for any such 
claims, and it is highly likely that Donald 
had greater value for other persons. Like 
“better prognosis," this principle is also to 
be applied only where the disparity be­
tween competitors is great; it will not de­
cide, for instance, between saving the 
parent of two children and the parent of 
three. Correctly applied, it reflects a funda­
mental moral commitment to protecting 
important human relationships.
First come, first served. “When both 
cannot live, treat the one who is presented 
for treatment first." This principle, which 
the leader of the team chose to follow, is 
blind to the particular characteristics of 
competing individuals; since George’s ar­
rest occurred first he is to be saved, but it 
could have happened the other way 
around. Insofar as the principle is neutral
to persons, it is similar to random selec­
tion, and seems to reflect a moral commit­
ment to the equality of all.
We might praise the team leader’s 
choice as reflecting a primary commit­
ment to the equality of persons. But is this 
what the team leader’s choice really 
shows? Note that both the other princi­
ples— "better prognosis” and “social 
worth"—would have required the team 
leader to make a comparative judgment 
about the conditions and circumstances of 
Donald and George. But the person-neu­
tral “first come, first served” principle re­
quires no background information about 
the competitors, presupposes no disparity 
except time of presentation for treatment, 
and will decide every hard-choice case 
except genuinely simultaneous ones. Did 
the team leader's choice (and do “ first 
come” institutional policies) actually re­
flect a commitment to human equality, or 
the fact that this distributive principle is 
easier to apply? The fact that every mem­
ber of the team "hesitated” before treat­
ing George suggests that other bases for 
decision were evident to all; is it sheer 
convenience that gives priority to this 
one?
Because non-neutral principles require 
judgments about conditions and circum­
stances, they are subject to bias when the 
disparities between competitors are small. 
Between Donald and George, however, 
the disparities in prognosis and social 
worth were very great; hence, bias would 
have been much less likely to arise.
To say that medicine might well pay 
greater attention to non-neutral distribu­
tive principles is not to deny that there 
will be disagreements over these princi­
ples, or occasions when relevant informa­
tion is not available, or cases in which 
there are multiple disparities, some of 
which favor one competitor and some the 
other. But these are the hard cases. The 
case of Donald and George is not a hard 
case: both non-neutral principles could 
have been applied and would have 
favored Donald over George. Only a two- 
minute disparity in time of presentation 
favored George; a genuinely neutral prin­
ciple would have permitted treatment of 
either one. In hard cases, retreat to neutral 
distributive principles cannot be avoided, 
but in this case the team retreated too 
soon. The society that resorts to easy 
strategies even before the choices become 
hard may fail to honor the fundamental 
moral commitments it makes.
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